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Abstract
This paper presents a Cournot oligopoly model with R&D spillovers
both within and across industries. The aim is to provide an appropri-
ate theoretical foundation for three different hypotheses regarding the
impact of the local production structure on innovation and output,
as well as addressing mixed empirical results in this area. Both the
effective R&D and total industry output are shown to increase with
the variety of industries, which is aligned with Jacobs externalities.
With respect to the concentration, the outcome is more ambiguous,
where it depends on the variety, both spillover rates, and the R&D ef-
ficiency. If the variety is limited, then partial support is given to both
Marshall-Arrow-Romer externalities in the case of effective R&D, and
to Porter externalities in the case of the total industry output. The
use of a relative rather than an absolute measure of variety is also
shown to be important.
JEL classification: O33, R11, L13.
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1 Introduction
Since Glaeser et al. (1992), numerous empirical studies have attempted to de-
termine which local production structures are most conducive to innovation,
in terms of their variety and concentration, i.e., whether regional diversity
or specialisation, and similarly local competition or concentration, encourage
innovation and growth. However, the empirical results obtained have been
mixed, where the three main hypotheses in this area, i.e., Marshall-Arrow-
Romer (MAR), Jacobs, and Porter externalities, have all found some support
(Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009; De Groot et al., 2009).
A further difficulty when trying to make sense of these mixed findings is
that Glaeser et al. (1992) and later studies did not provide any fully devel-
oped theories about how the local production structure affects innovation.
The theoretical foundations may be identified in industrial economics because
there have been many theoretical studies of knowledge spillovers and inno-
vation incentives. However, most of these studies focused on R&D spillovers
within a single industry and how R&D cooperation can affect the outcome
in this context (see, De Bondt, 1997).
Indeed, it appears that only Steurs (1995) considered the simultaneous
occurrence of intra- and inter-industry knowledge spillovers, where he ex-
amined the case of a two-industry, two-firm-per-industry model and allowed
R&D spillovers to occur both within and between industries. Steurs’ the-
oretical model demonstrates that the two spillover channels have different
but interdependent effects on R&D, but he did not determine how the lo-
cal production structure affects the outcome. As noted by several authors,
among the micro-foundations of urban agglomeration, learning and knowl-
edge spillovers are the least understood, and thus there is an urgent need to
advance theoretical research into localised knowledge spillovers, which should
inform empirical research rather than lagging behind it (Duranton and Puga,
2004; Fujita and Krugman, 2004; Puga, 2010).
The present study builds on previous theoretical research by consider-
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ing the case of non-cooperative Cournot oligopolists, which invest in cost-
reducing or demand-enhancing technology. Steurs’ (1995) model is extended
to consider several industries as well as several firms within each of them.
Hence, the firms make their R&D investments in the presence of spillovers
both within and beyond their respective industries. This study’s main the-
oretical contribution is showing how the level of concentration within local
industries and the variety of these industries affects innovation and output.
Thus, I attempt to uncover the theoretical circumstances under which the
three aforementioned hypotheses can be expected to hold. Therefore, the aim
is to bring some clarity to the mixed empirical results and the overall impli-
cations for regional economic policy. The results show that variety increases
both effective R&D and the industry output, which is aligned with Jacobs
externalities, whereas the effect of concentration depends on several factors.
In specific circumstances, there is partial support for both MAR and Porter
externalities, which also indicates how the model specification can affect the
empirical results. Similarly, the outcome is shown to differ when a relative
rather than an absolute measure of variety is used.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides
a brief review of theoretical and empirical research into inter- and intra-
industry knowledge spillovers. Section 3 presents the theoretical model and
its equilibrium analysis. The most interesting questions concern the compar-
ative statics, particularly how the effective R&D and total industry output
respond to changes in the variety and concentration of local industries. These
issues are addressed in section 4, which is followed by the conclusions.
2 Literature Review
To the best of my knowledge, Bernstein (1988) was the first empirical study
of both intra- and inter-industry R&D spillovers to consider these as proper
externalities. Bernstein found that the firms’ R&D investments were either
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substitutes for (or complementary to) intra-industry spillovers depending on
the size of the firms’ R&D propensities. The effect of inter-industry spillovers
was found to be small and the same for all industries. Thus, the extent of
intra-industry spillovers was the key factor according to Bernstein (1988).
With the exception of Bernstein (1988), Glaeser et al. (1992) marked the
true beginning of empirical research into the relative importance of intra-
and inter-industry spillovers, as well as the role of the local production struc-
ture in this respect. Based on previous theoretical research, they formulated
three distinct, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, hypotheses regarding
localised knowledge spillovers. The first, MAR externalities, is attributed
to the insights of the economists Alfred Marshall, Kenneth Arrow and Paul
Romer. According to this hypothesis, regions or cities that are specialised
in one or a few types of industry benefit more from localised knowledge
spillovers, which are further induced by the concentration of these indus-
tries. Porter externalities, which are attributed to the management scholar
Michael Porter, also flourish in specialised local production structures but
they benefit from increased levels of competition instead. Finally, Jacobs ex-
ternalities, named after the urban theorist Jane Jacobs, are most prominent
in locations with diverse industrial base. Both the variety of industries and
the level of competition within them are considered to be conducive to inno-
vation in this hypothesis. Interestingly, Glaeser et al. (1992) did not present
a hypothesis, according to which diverse and concentrated local production
structures would be the best combination.
Glaeser et al. (1992) proceeded to test the hypotheses with U.S. city-
level data and found support for Jacobs externalities. Many studies followed
and there has been a continuous stream of related empirical research up to
the present. For example, a survey by Beaudry and Schiffauerova (2009)
analysed the results of 67 studies in this area. Similarly, De Groot et al.
(2009) performed a meta-analysis of 31 empirical studies of agglomeration
externalities. A major issue identified by these surveys is that the empirical
4
results are very mixed. Depending on the context (e.g., the data, time period
and empirical model), support was found for each of the three hypotheses.
In particular, the choice of the dependent variable tended to lead to different
results.
Glaeser et al. (1992) formulated their hypotheses loosely based on the
ideas proposed in previous studies but to the best of my knowledge, a formal
model has never been developed that could explain the underlying mecha-
nisms. This is an interesting issue in itself, but the lack of a formal theory
makes it difficult to interpret the mixed empirical findings because we have
no clear idea of how particular circumstances affect the spillover mechanisms,
or the importance of the specification of the empirical model.
Since the geography of innovation research is mainly empirically orien-
tated, the theoretical basis must be sought elsewhere. In industrial eco-
nomics, based on the seminal studies of Spence (1984), d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992), there has been much theoretical
research into (intra-industry) knowledge spillovers and innovation incentives.
Two main ways of modelling R&D spillovers exist: spillovers concerning ei-
ther R&D inputs or outputs. In both cases, spillovers decrease the R&D
investments of firms, because there is less to gain from these investments
and more from free riding. However, the effective R&D of firms, which com-
prises the sum of its own R&D propensity and the received spillovers, is also
decreasing with the spillover rate in the case of input spillovers. Thus, in-
put spillovers are unlikely to explain geographically concentrated innovation
(Leppa¨la¨, 2014). However, in the case of output spillovers, the effective R&D
is maximised with a spillover rate of exactly one half.
De Bondt et al. (1992) found that effective R&D is increasing in concen-
tration in the case of a single industry. If the number of firms in the industry
increases, the firms have less incentive to invest in R&D, which is not com-
pensated for by the increased number of spillover sources. Interestingly, the
presence of inter-industry R&D spillovers affects this result, as shown in the
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present study.
A related research area considers whether localised knowledge spillovers
lead to agglomeration (e.g. Van Long and Soubeyran, 1998). The results
are slightly mixed, but Leppa¨la¨ (2014) showed that in the absence of any
opposing factors firms in an industry have a preference to agglomerate in
order to maximise the spillovers between them. Since inter-industry spillovers
can be expected to only reinforce this incentive, we do not consider the choice
of location in the present study and it is assumed that the firms and industries
are already agglomerated.
Even in industrial economics, research into inter-industry spillovers is
almost non-existent and most extensions concern R&D cooperation in the
context of a single industry. Extra-industry sources of R&D were included
in the model proposed by Cohen and Levinthal (1989) but they were taken
as exogenous. Later, Katsoutacos and Ulph (1998) and Leahy and Neary
(1999) compared cases where firms operate either in the same or different
industries, but they did not study the case where both inter- and intra-
industry spillovers occur simultaneously. Some theoretical studies have also
considered spillovers between vertically related firms (Atallah, 2002; Ishii,
2004).
To the best of my knowledge, Steurs (1995) is the only previous study to
consider spillovers between completely segmented industries, as well as within
them. Steurs’ model considers the case of two industries where both are
duopolies; otherwise, the firms and industries are completely identical, but
the inter- and intra-industry spillover rates are allowed to be different. Steurs
showed that inter-industry spillovers always increase the effective R&D, but
they also decrease the rate of intra-industry spillovers, which maximises the
effective R&D. Thus, inter- and intra-industry spillovers are strategically
interdependent.
To analyse the effect of the variety and concentration of the local produc-
tion structure, the present study extends Steurs’ model to consider several
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firms as well as industries. R&D cooperation is not of direct interest in this
case because it has no role in the three hypotheses and it has little supporting
empirical evidence (Brenner, 2007). Thus, instead of addressing R&D coop-
eration in the present study, I direct the reader to Steurs (1995) for further
details.
3 The model
We consider an agglomeration of m identical industries, where each comprises
n identical firms that produce a homogeneous output. qij is the output
produced and sold by firm i in industry j, and the total output of industry j
is Qj =
∑n
i=1 qij. It is also assumed that the markets are perfectly segmented
and that the final outputs are independent. In each market, the firms face a
linear inverse demand curve with the same characteristics: Pj = a−Qj, ∀j ∈
m, a > Qj ≥ 0.
The (initial) unit cost of all firms across the industries is c. Xij is the
firm’s effective R&D and a > c > Xij ≥ 0. In this context, R&D output
can be considered as a cost reduction or equally well as a demand-enhancing
invention (De Bondt and Veugelers, 1991). Effective R&D is given by
Xij = xij + β
∑
xkj + Z,
where xij is the firm’s own R&D output, β
∑
xkj, k 6= i are the output
spillovers from the other firms in the same industry and Z are the spillovers
from firms in the other industries. β ∈ [0, 1] is the intra-industry spillover
rate. Furthermore, Z = σ
∑∑
xil, l 6= j, where σ ∈ [0, 1] is the inter-
industry spillover rate.
As assumed in previous studies, the cost of the firm’s own R&D output
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xij is quadratic and given by
C(xij) =
1
2
γx2ij,
where γ > 0 is an inverse measure of the efficiency of R&D. We assume
that the values of β and σ are exogenous, where they reflect the extent to
which R&D is leaked and useful across firms and different industries. It
is further assumed that the m industries are technologically related, such
that some beneficial spillovers exist between them (Frenken et al., 2007).
As shown by Bernstein and Nadiri (1988), the set of industries bound by
spillovers may not be large. Thus, there may be other industries in the same
location as well, but they are not related in this sense. It is a highly stylised
assumption that the firms, and particularly the industries, are identical in
every respect, but it facilitates our analysis with respect to the impact of
variety and concentration. However, we briefly discuss how some differences
between the industries may affect the outcome.
The firms play a two-stage game. In the first stage, the firms in all indus-
tries simultaneously decide their R&D outputs, xij. In the second stage, the
firms engage in Cournot competition and choose their final good outputs, qij.
For expository reasons, we assume that there is no uncertainty with respect
to the R&D output, and discounting between the stages is also ignored. We
derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibria by backward induction.
3.1 Symmetric equilibria
In the final production stage, firm i in industry j maximises its profit function
given by
piij = (a−Qj − c+Xij)qij.
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The Cournot equilibrium output is
q∗ij =
a− c+ nXij −
∑
Xkj
n+ 1
=
a− c+ Z + (n− (n− 1)β)xij + (2β − 1)
∑
xkj
n+ 1
(1)
for all firms i, k ∈ n, k 6= i. Subsequently, the total output in industry j is
Qj =
n(a− c+ Z) + (1 + β(n− 1))∑xij
n+ 1
. (2)
In the first stage, the firms choose their R&D levels. Given the subsequent
output levels, firm i chooses xij in order to maximise
piij = (q
∗
ij)
2 − 1
2
γx2ij,
where q∗ij is given by Equation (1).
The first order condition gives the best response function
xij(xkj) =
2(a− c+ Z + (2β − 1)∑xkj)(n− (n− 1)β)
γ(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− (n− 1)β)2 (3)
for firm i. This shows us that the R&D outputs xkj are strategic substitutes
for xij if β < 1/2 and complements if the inequality is reversed. However,
inter-industry spillovers through Z are always strategic complements.
The second order conditions in the R&D stage require that the numerator
in the best response functions is positive. This holds for all β ∈ [0, 1] when
γ > 2n2/(n + 1)2. The stability condition requires that the best response
functions cross correctly (Henriques, 1990), which holds ∀β ∈ [0, 1] when
γ > 2n/(n+ 1).
First, assuming that the firms in industry j make a symmetric choice,
xij = xj, ∀i ∈ n, then the best response function (3) gives the following
equilibrium R&D output:
x∗j =
2(a− c+ Z)(n− (n− 1)β)
γ(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− (n− 1)β)(1 + (n− 1)β) . (4)
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We also assume symmetry across the industries, but Equation (4) allows
us to consider the implications of any differences between them. For example,
a larger initial market size, a−c, or higher R&D efficiency, i.e., lower γ, would
imply larger equilibrium R&D outputs in industry j. Similarly, through Z,
larger R&D outputs in other industries or a higher rate of inter-industry
spillovers, σ, have the same effect. Therefore, there is a feedback loop through
inter-industry spillovers, which further reinforces any positive or negative
effects. Do¨ring and Schnellenbach (2006) noted that inter-industry spillovers
tend to be asymmetric or one-directional. Our model does not consider such
cases, but we can conjecture that these would diminish the feedback loop.
Since the industries are identical, there is also symmetry across them and
thus x∗j = x
∗, ∀j ∈ m. Substituting Z = σ(m−1)nx∗ into Equation (4) gives
the equilibrium R&D output:
x∗ =
2(a− c)(n− (n− 1)β)
γ(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− (n− 1)β)(nσ(m− 1) + (n− 1)β + 1) . (5)
The interior and positive solutions for R&D outputs are guaranteed for
γ > 2n(nm−n+1)/(n+1)2,∀β, σ ∈ [0, 1]. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 γ > 2n(nm−n+1)
(n+1)2
if m ≥ 2 and γ > 2n/(n+ 1) if m = 1.
In addition to guaranteeing the interior and positive solutions, this as-
sumption ensures that the stability condition is also met in the case of a
single industry. Thus, we need to ensure that the R&D efficiency is not too
high with respect to m and n. This assumption also indicates that γ > 1 at
the very least.
Finally, after multiplying Equation (5) by (nσ(m− 1) + (n− 1)β + 1), it
follows that the effective R&D is given by
X =
2(a− c)(n− (n− 1)β)(nσ(m− 1) + (n− 1)β + 1)
γ(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− (n− 1)β)(nσ(m− 1) + (n− 1)β + 1) . (6)
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The firm level equilibrium output is
q∗ =
a− c+X
n+ 1
,
where X is given by Equation (6), and the total industry output is then
Q = nq∗.
4 Comparative statics
Instead of a complete welfare analysis, this section concentrates on study-
ing the changes in the effective R&D and total industry output, which are
the most relevant with regard to the dependent variables used in empiri-
cal research. These variables are typically measures of innovation, economic
growth or productivity (Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009). Empirical re-
searchers also use relative measures of variety and the final subsection shows
how this can make a difference to the outcome.
4.1 Effective R&D
The first interesting issue regarding comparative statics concerns the effects
of the two spillover rates on effective R&D.
Proposition 1 Effective R&D always increases in the inter-industry spillover
rate, σ, whereas the intra-industry spillover rate that maximises effective
R&D is given by β∗ = max{1
2
n−1−nσ(m−1)
n−1 , 0}.
Proof. Both β and σ exists only in the term
A ≡ (n− (n− 1)β)(nσ(m− 1) + (n− 1)β + 1)
in the numerator and denominator of Equation (6), which is increasing in A.
Since ∂A
∂σ
= (n− (n− 1)β)n(m− 1) > 0, also ∂X
∂σ
= ∂X
∂A
∂A
∂σ
> 0.
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Setting ∂A
∂β
= −(n−1)(nσ(m−1)+(n−1)β)+1)+(n−(n−1)β)(n−1) equal
to zero gives the optimal intra-industry spillover rate β∗ = 1
2
n−1−nσ(m−1)
n−1 .
Since the spillovers cannot be negative, β∗ = 0 if nσ(m− 1) > n− 1.
As noted by Steurs (1995), inter-industry spillovers reinforce the disin-
centive effect of intra-industry spillovers. However, as may be expected, this
depends on the number of industries and firms as well as on the inter-industry
spillover rate σ. It is easy to verify that without inter-industry spillovers,
the optimal intra-industry spillover rate corresponds to previous results, i.e.,
β = 1/2. However, the optimal β approaches zero as the inter-industry
spillovers increase through σ or m, whereas an increase in the number of
firms has the opposite effect as ∂β
∗
∂n
= 1
2
σ(m−1)
(n−1)2 ≥ 0.
This may appear to give some support to MAR and Porter externalities
because the variety of sectors limits optimal intra-industry spillovers. How-
ever, it is still the case that the maximal inter-industry spillover rate, σ = 1,
and no intra-industry spillovers, β = 0, yield the highest effective R&D.
However, it is unlikely that the spillover rates will differ from each other so
greatly, in particular that the inter-industry spillover rate is (substantially)
higher than the intra-industry rate. That is, we might consider that it is
unlikely that firms could benefit more from external R&D derived from a
different industry rather than their own. Therefore, we analyse this trade-off
between the spillover rates by studying the case where the two rates are the
same.
Proposition 2 If the intra- and inter-industry spillover rates are equal, β =
σ = φ, then the common spillover rate that maximises effective R&D is given
by φ∗ = 1
2
n2m−2n+1
n2m−nm−n+1 ∈
[
1
2
, 1
)
, with ∂φ
∗
∂m
> 0, ∂φ
∗
∂n
< 0.
Proof. By setting β = σ = φ, Equation (6) becomes
X ′ =
2(a− c)(n− (n− 1)φ)(nmφ− φ+ 1)
γ(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− (n− 1)φ)(nmφ− φ+ 1) .
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The first order condition,
∂X ′
∂φ
=
2(a− c)γ(n+ 1)2(n2m− 2n2mφ+ 2nmφ+ 2nφ− 2n− 2φ+ 1)
(γ(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− (n− 1)φ)(nmφ− φ+ 1))2 = 0,
gives the optimal spillover rate φ∗ = 1
2
n2m−2n+1
n2m−nm−n+1 . φ
∗ is increasing in m as
∂φ∗
∂m
= 1
2
n
(nm−1)2 > 0, and decreasing in n as
∂φ∗
∂n
= −1
2
(m−1)(n2m−1)
(n−1)2(nm−1)2 < 0.
Both inter- and intra-industry spillovers exist only when m,n ≥ 2. Using
L’Hoˆpital’s rule, the lower bound of φ∗ is given by limn→∞ φ∗ = 12 = φ
∗
¯
.
Using the same rule again, limm→∞ φ∗ = 12
n
n−1 at n = 2 gives the upper
bound, φ¯∗ = 1.
It is interesting that the optimal spillover rate in this case is on the higher
range of spillovers, which is bounded below by 1
2
. Unsurprisingly, the optimal
rate approaches 1 as the variety increases because this makes inter-industry
spillovers relatively more important. The number of firms has the opposite
effect because rivalry becomes more intense.
Proposition 3 An increase in the number of industries, m, always leads to
an increase in effective R&D.
Proof. This proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. m exists only in the
term A of Equation (6). It is straightforward to see that A is increasing in
m and hence the same holds for X.
This proposition provides central support for Jacobs externalities because
there is no trade-off with respect to variety. This trade-off may arise if space
is limited, but it also requires that the number of firms within an industry
has a similar, positive effect. This other aspect of Jacobs externalities, i.e.,
the positive effect of competition, will be studied next.
Proposition 4 If 3βσm + 4β2 − 3βσ − 2σm − 4β + 2σ + 1 > 0, which is
always the case if β ≥ 2
3
or either σ = 0 or m = 1, and β 6= 1
2
, then the
effective R&D is maximised for n∗ = βσm+4β
2−βσ−4β+1
3βσm+4β2−3βσ−2σm−4β+2σ+1 firms, where
13
∂n∗
∂m
, ∂n
∗
∂σ
> 0, and ∂n
∗
∂β
≥ 0 if 0 ≤ β ≤ 1− 1
2
√
σm− σ + 1. Otherwise, effective
R&D is always increasing in n.
Proof. Effective R&D is non-decreasing in n when
∂X
∂n
=
2(a− c)γ(n+ 1)2(Cn−B)
(γ(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− (n− 1)φ)(nmφ− φ+ 1))2 ≥ 0, (7)
with
B = −βσm− 4β2 + βσ + 4β − 1,
C = −3βσm− 4β2 + 3βσ + 2σm+ 4β − 2σ − 1.
Since the other terms in Equation (7) are always positive, its sign depends on
the sign of (Cn−B). Hence, effective R&D is increasing in n when Cn ≥ B.
B is non-increasing in m and σ, since ∂B
∂m
= −βσ ≤ 0 and ∂B
∂σ
= −βm+β ≤ 0.
When m = 1 or σ = 0, B = −4β2 + 4β − 1 ≤ 0, which holds as an equality
when β = 1
2
. Therefore, B ≤ 0.
If C < 0, effective R&D is non-decreasing in n when
n ≤ B
C
=
βσm+ 4β2 − βσ − 4β + 1
3βσm+ 4β2 − 3βσ − 2σm− 4β + 2σ + 1 , (8)
and maximised when Equation (8) holds as an equality. n∗ is increasing in
m and σ, since
∂n∗
∂m
=
2σ(1− β)(2β − 1)2
(3βσm+ 4β2 − 3βσ − 2σm− 4β + 2σ + 1)2 > 0
and
∂n∗
∂σ
=
2(m− 1)(1− β)(2β − 1)2
(3βσm+ 4β2 − 3βσ − 2σm− 4β + 2σ + 1)2 > 0.
n∗ is also non-decreasing in β when
∂n∗
∂β
=
2σ(m− 1)(4β2 − σm− 8β + σ + 3)
(3βσm+ 4β2 − 3βσ − 2σm− 4β + 2σ + 1)2 ≥ 0
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or
4β2 − σm− 8β + σ + 3 ≥ 0. (9)
Equation (9) has two roots, β = 1 ± 1
2
√
σm− σ + 1. Since the larger root
is more than 1 and the leading coefficient is positive, then Equation (9) is
non-negative if 0 ≤ β ≤ 1− 1
2
√
σm− σ + 1.
C is decreasing in β when ∂C
∂β
= −3σm − 8β + 3σ + 4 < 0 or β >
−3
8
σm + 3
8
σ + 1
2
≤ 1
2
. When β = 2
3
, C = −1
9
, and thus C < 0 always when
β ≥ 2
3
. If m = 1 or σ = 0, then C = −4β2 + 4β− 1 < 0 provided that β 6= 1
2
.
If C > 0, effective R&D is non-decreasing in n when n ≥ B
C
, which
holds for all n, since then B
C
≤ 0. If C = 0, then Equation (7) is always
non-negative.
With respect to competition, the results are more mixed. They are
aligned with Jacobs externalities in the sense that a wider variety makes
the optimal number of firms larger or even infinite for effective R&D. How-
ever, if the variety is low or intra-industry spillovers are high, then a more
concentrated industry becomes optimal for effective R&D. In this case, the
increased competition within an industry dominates the spillovers received
from other industries. This issue is studied more deeply in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 In the absence of inter-industry R&D spillovers a monopoly
maximises effective R&D, except when β = 1
2
, in which case the number of
firms has no effect and X = a−c
2γ−1 .
Proof. If either σ = 0 or m = 1, then B = C. B and C are not equal to zero
if β 6= 1
2
, and from Equation (8), we find that effective R&D is maximised
for n = 1. Equation (6) gives X = a−c
2γ−1 in this case.
If β = 1/2, then B = C = 0 and Equation (7) is zero. Again, from
Equation (6), we find that X = a−c
2γ−1 .
This result, which is the same as in De Bondt et al. (1992), indicates
that effective R&D is typically decreasing with competition within a single
15
industry. However, an interesting exception, which was not mentioned by
De Bondt et al. (1992), is β = 1
2
when the number of firms has no effect.
Nevertheless, this result partially supports MAR externalities. Thus, if the
variety is low, then concentration increases effective R&D. However, this
result shows that effective R&D might not always be the most important
performance measure to consider.
4.2 Industry Output
The dependent variable in empirical research has not always been a measure
of R&D. Instead, some researchers have studied the impact of variety and
concentration on variables such as employment and output. Therefore, it
is important to determine how the total industry output is affected because
this is more relevant with respect to some empirical studies.
Proposition 5 Total industry output is increasing in m and σ, as well as
in β when β ≤ max{1
2
n−1−nσ(m−1)
n−1 , 0}.
Proof. The total output of a single industry is
Q = n
a− c+X
n+ 1
, (10)
where X is given by Equation (6). Since m, σ and β appear only in X and Q
is increasing in X, then Q must always be increasing in m and σ, as well as
in β when β ≤ max{1
2
n−1−nσ(m−1)
n−1 , 0}, as determined earlier in Propositions
1 and 3.
Again, we are given further support for the Jacobs spillover hypothesis
because the total industry output is also increasing in the variety of indus-
tries as well as their spillovers. Indeed, empirical research also supports
Jacobs externalities most often when studying economic growth (Beaudry
and Schiffauerova, 2009). As in Proposition 1, the optimal intra-industry
spillover rate is shown to be restricted by inter-industry spillovers. The next
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step is to determine how the concentration of industries affects the total
industry output.
Proposition 6 The total industry output is increasing in n if 4βσm+6β2−
4βσ − 2σm − 6β + 2σ + 2 − γ ≤ 0, which is always the case if β ≤ 1
2
and
γ ≥ 2σ − 2σm + 2; otherwise, the total industry output is maximised for
n∗ = 2(2β
2−2β+γ)
4βσm+6β2−4βσ−2σm−6β+2σ+2−γ firms, where
∂n∗
∂m
, ∂n
∗
∂σ
< 0, and ∂n
∗
∂γ
> 0
when β > 1
2
.
Proof. An increase in n changes the total industry output by
Q(n+ 1)−Q(n) = (a− c)(n+ 1)nγ
γ(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− (n− 1)β)(nσ(m− 1) + (n− 1)β + 1)
− (a− c)(n+ 2)(n+ 1)γ
γ(n+ 2)2 − 2(n− nβ + 1)(nσ(m− 1) + nβ + σm− σ + 1)
or
Q(n+ 1)−Q(n) = (a− c)(n+ 1)γ(Dn− E)
F
, (11)
with
D = −4βσm− 6β2 + 4βσ + 2σm+ 6β − 2σ − 2 + γ,
E = −2(2β2 − 2β + γ),
and
F = (γ(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− (n− 1)β)(nσ(m− 1) + (n− 1)β + 1))
×(γ(n+ 2)2 − 2(n− nβ + 1)(nσ(m− 1) + nβ + σm− σ + 1)).
Given the positivity of outputs, F > 0. Hence, the sign of Equation (11)
depends on the sign of (Dn − E). Given Assumption 1, E < 0 as well.
Therefore, if D ≥ 0, the output is increasing in n. D is decreasing in β
when ∂D
∂β
= −4σm − 12β + 4σ + 6 < 0 or β > −1
3
σm + 1
3
σ + 1
2
≤ 1
2
. When
β = 1
2
, D = γ − 1
2
, which is positive given Assumption 1. When β = 0,
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D = γ−2σ+ 2σm−2, and thus D ≥ 0 if both β ≤ 1
2
and γ ≥ 2σ−2σm+ 2.
If D < 0, the industry output is maximised for
n∗ =
E
D
=
2(2β2 − 2β + γ)
4βσm+ 6β2 − 4βσ − 2σm− 6β + 2σ + 2− γ .
If β > 1
2
, then
∂n∗
∂m
= − 2(2β
2 − 2β + γ)(4βσ − 2σ)
(4βσm+ 6β2 − 4βσ − 2σm− 6β + 2σ + 2− γ)2 < 0,
∂n∗
∂σ
= − 2(2β
2 − 2β + γ)(4βm− 4β − 2m+ 2))
(4βσm+ 6β2 − 4βσ − 2σm− 6β + 2σ + 2− γ)2 < 0,
and
∂n∗
∂γ
=
4(2β − 1)(σm+ 2β − σ − 1)
(4βσm+ 6β2 − 4βσ − 2σm− 6β + 2σ + 2− γ)2 > 0,
thereby demonstrating how n∗ responds to changes in m, σ and γ.
Similar to the case of the effective R&D, whether the total industry out-
put is increasing or decreasing with concentration depends on both spillover
rates and the variety of industries, but now also on the R&D efficiency. By
comparing Propositions 4 and 6, we can see the conditions, under which
n always has a positive effect or the optimal, finite n exists, are different.
Thus, there may be cases where concentration positively affects the effective
R&D but not the output. Previous empirical research shows that when the
independent variable is economic growth, MAR externalities appear to have
a positive impact far less often and even a negative effect in several cases
(Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009). This issue is illustrated most clearly by
examining the case where no inter-industry spillovers occur (or they are held
constant), as follows.
Corollary 2 In the absence of inter-industry R&D spillovers, the total in-
dustry output is always increasing in n when γ ≥ 6β2 − 6β + 2 and never
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maximised by monopoly.
Proof. When m = 1, D = −6β2 + 6β + γ − 2, which is non-negative when
γ ≥ 6β2 − 6β + 2. If monopoly maximises the total industry output, then
n∗ =
2(2β2 − 2β + γ)
6β2 − 6β − γ + 2 < 2
or γ < 2β2 − 2β + 1 ≤ 1, but this contradicts Assumption 1.
Corollary 2 shows that there is a wide range of cases where the total
industry output is increasing with the number of firms when studying a
single industry. For example, this holds when β is 1
2
or close to it, or always
when γ > 2. Thus, this model gives partial support to Porter externalities
because increased competition with limited variety can improve the outcome
in terms of the total industry output. A further contrast with Corollary 1 is
that monopoly is never the optimal market structure in this case. Therefore,
it is not surprising that even when monopoly leads to the maximal effective
R&D, the monopoly output is not the largest possible. This is a further
illustration of how the choice of the dependent variable in empirical research
can have major consequences.
4.3 Impact of the Relative Variety of Industries
In our model, an increase in the variety of industries leads also to an increase
in the size of the local economy. This contributes partly to the outcome that
both the effective R&D and industry output are always increasing in variety.
Thus, there is a natural link between the size and variety of the local economic
base, but it also combines two different effects, which we may wish to analyse
separately. Similarly, empirical researchers have studied the effect of relative
variety as well as that of absolute variety. A literature survey showed that
how variety is measured also affects the empirical findings (De Groot et al.,
2009).
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To study the impact of variety in a purely relative sense, we make a
simple modification to the model by assuming that the inverse demand in all
m industries is given by Pj = a−mQj ∀j ∈ m, a > mQj ≥ 0. As the slope
of the demand curve now depends on the number of industries, the aggregate
local demand becomes independent of it:
∑m
j=1Qj = a− P¯ , where P¯ is the
average price across industries.
Given the modified demand function, the equilibrium R&D output be-
comes
x∗ =
2(a− c)(n− (n− 1)β)
γm(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− (n− 1)β)(nσ(m− 1) + (n− 1)β + 1) . (12)
To guarantee the interior and positive solutions for R&D outputs ∀β, σ ∈
[0, 1], we now make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 γ > 2n(nm−n+1)
m(n+1)2
if m ≥ 2 and γ > 2n/(n+ 1) if m = 1.
By multiplying Equation (12) with (nσ(m− 1) + (n− 1)β + 1), it follows
that the effective R&D is now given by
X =
2(a− c)(n− (n− 1)β)(nσ(m− 1) + (n− 1)β + 1)
γm(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− (n− 1)β)(nσ(m− 1) + (n− 1)β + 1) . (13)
Subsequently, the firm-level equilibrium output is
q∗ =
a− c+X
(n+ 1)m
, (14)
where X is given by Equation (13). The total industry output is then Q =
nq∗.
Proposition 7 Effective R&D is non-decreasing in relative variety if σ ≥
β(n−1)+1
n
∈ [ 1
n
, 1
]
.
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Proof. Differentiating Equation (13) with respect to m gives
∂X
∂m
=
2(a− c)γ(n+ 1)2(n− (n− 1)β)(σn− 1− β(n− 1))
(γm(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− (n− 1)β)(nσ(m− 1) + (n− 1)β + 1))2 . (15)
Clearly, both the denominator of (15) and 2(a−c)γ(n+1)2(n−(n−1)β) in the
numerator are positive. Hence, (15) is non-negative when σn−1−β(n−1) ≥ 0
or σ ≥ β(n−1)+1
n
∈ [ 1
n
, 1
]
.
Proposition 7 shows that, in contrast to the case of absolute variety, the
effect of relative variety on effective R&D depends on the spillover rates. In
principle, the effective R&D is increasing in relative variety if and only if
the inter-industry spillover rate is sufficiently higher than the intra-industry
spillover rate. Therefore, the effect of relative variety is similar to that of
competition in Proposition 4.
Proposition 8 The total industry output is non-decreasing in relative vari-
ety if γ(n+ 1)2 + 2βσn2 − 2βσn− 2σn2 ≤ 0.
Proof. Substituting Equation (13) into Equation (14) and simplifying the
expression gives
q∗ =
(a− c)γ(n+ 1)
γm(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− (n− 1)β)(nσ(m− 1) + (n− 1)β + 1) . (16)
Since m appears only in the denominator of (16),
∂q∗
∂m
≥ 0↔ ∂(γm(n+ 1)
2 − 2(n− (n− 1)β)(nσ(m− 1) + (n− 1)β + 1))
∂m
≤ 0
↔ γ(n+ 1)2 + 2βσn2 − 2βσn− 2σn2 ≤ 0.
Similar to the case of competition (Proposition 6), for relative variety
to have a positive effect on the total industry output, we require relatively
high inter-industry and low intra-industry spillover rates. However, this ef-
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fect also requires a sufficiently high cost-efficiency of R&D (low γ). Overall,
Propositions 7 and 8 demonstrate that excluding the size effect and examin-
ing variety purely in relative terms means that its impact is conditional on
other factors.
5 Conclusion
This study had two main aims: to provide appropriate theoretical founda-
tions for MAR, Porter and Jacobs externalities; and to address the mixed
empirical results with respect to these three hypotheses. The theoretical
model supports Jacobs externalities most strongly, which is aligned with the
empirical results (Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009; De Groot et al., 2009).
That is, both effective R&D and the total industry output are increasing
with the variety of local industries. However, we considered the number of
industries between which there are spillovers, which is often not the same as
the total number of local industries. Following Frenken et al. (2007), more
recent empirical studies have attempted to consider this “related variety” of
local industries.
With respect to concentration, the theoretical model yields more mixed
implications because the outcome depends on the variety of industries, intra-
and inter-industry spillover rates, and R&D efficiency. However, this may
help to clarify the similarly mixed empirical results (De Groot et al., 2009).
If the variety is high, effective R&D can be increasing in competition. How-
ever, this requires that intra-industry spillovers are not too high because an
optimal industry concentration would exist otherwise. The outcome is sim-
ilar with respect to the total industry output, but a wider variety of cases
exists where output is increasing with competition or the optimal number
of firms is higher. Nevertheless, the support for Jacobs externalities is only
partial in this case. However, why Glaeser et al. (1992) attributed competi-
tion to Jacobs externalities is less clear because Jacobs (1969) merely argues
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that larger organisations tend to be less innovative (see, also Beaudry and
Schiffauerova, 2009). Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the
effect of competition depends on other factors and it may vary for differ-
ent performance measures. If variety is low, then concentration is found to
increase effective R&D, which then gives partial support for the MAR ex-
ternalities. By contrast, when variety is low, competition typically increases
total industry output, which then supports Porter externalities. Therefore,
the choice of the dependent variable may be critical in empirical research.
How the independent variables are selected is also a critical issue. For
example, under the same circumstances, the effective R&D can be shown
to be increasing with the average number of firms but decreasing if only
the number of firms in that particular industry increases. A related issue
is that many empirical studies have used relative measures of variety and
concentration, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Furthermore, the
choice between relative and absolute measures is known to affect the outcome
of the analysis substantially (De Groot et al., 2009). We have shown that this
is not surprising because the use of a relative measure means that the positive
effect of variety on the two performance measures becomes conditional on the
other factors.
The proposed model is based on standard spillover models, and thus a
logical next step would be considering how well it corresponds with the em-
pirical models and the reality that they aim to explain. An obvious and
crude simplification is the assumed symmetry between firms and industries,
but a few others should be mentioned in addition. The underlying idea of
Porter externalities is that competition fosters innovation because the firms
would not survive otherwise. This aspect of competition is missing from our
model, so it may not fully consider Porter externalities. However, this shows
that further theoretical work regarding Porter externalities is warranted. An-
other way to extend the model would be to introduce absorptive capacity,
e.g., as presented in Martin (2002), because its relevance has been empha-
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sised in innovation studies. However, although the absorptive capacity has
been found to increase the R&D investments of firms, it is not expected to
reverse the trends identified in the present study with respect to variety and
concentration.
Another point that should be emphasised is that some authors have con-
sidered spillovers not only in terms of imitating existing technologies, but also
how they foster subsequent inventions. This issue was particularly relevant to
Jacobs (1969). It is not clear how this phenomenon should be formalised, but
it may be that variety increases the R&D efficiency of firms instead of pro-
viding direct inter-industry spillovers. Again, this would probably support
our main finding that inter-industry R&D spillovers strongly facilitate inno-
vation and growth. In summary, the present study demands more theoretical
work and it is merely an early step in this area, but it also highlights several
critical issues that should be considered when building empirical models to
study localised knowledge spillovers and interpreting their results.
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